Critical minerals race intensifies as China and Africa reshape supply chains in the energy transition

The global race for critical minerals has moved from a niche industrial question to a central fault line in the energy transition. As governments, manufacturers and investors push to replace fossil fuels with electrified systems, minerals such as lithium, cobalt, copper, graphite and rare earths have become indispensable inputs for batteries, grids, wind turbines and digital infrastructure. The International Energy Agency’s 2025 Global Critical Minerals Outlook says demand for lithium could rise fivefold by 2040, while copper demand is set to climb by about 30% over the same period. It also warns that announced mining and refining projects may still leave markets short of copper and lithium by 2035, even as the world needs around $500bn of investment by 2040 under current policies.

The problem is not simply rising demand. It is concentration. The IEA says the top three countries in mineral refining accounted for 86% of market share in 2024, up from 82% in 2020, with most of that gain attributable to China. Beijing remains dominant in the processing of lithium, cobalt, graphite and rare earths, giving it leverage over supply chains that are now essential to clean energy and advanced manufacturing. That leverage has become more visible in recent years as China has tightened export controls on materials including gallium, germanium, antimony and several rare earth-related products, underscoring how industrial policy can quickly become a geopolitical instrument.

The Democratic Republic of Congo illustrates the same vulnerability from another angle. The country accounts for the bulk of global cobalt output, and its authorities have repeatedly moved to manage exports in an effort to stabilise prices and secure greater value for the domestic economy. After a suspension earlier in 2025, the government introduced a quota system that capped shipments for the rest of the year and set a ceiling for 2026. The measures underline the degree to which supply security in critical minerals is now shaped as much by policy decisions in producing states as by market forces.

That has pushed Western governments into a belated scramble to diversify sources, finance infrastructure and secure processing capacity outside China. In Washington, the US has sharpened its focus on strategic stockpiling and overseas investment, while the US International Development Finance Corporation has been building a sizeable pipeline of projects covering mining, refining and logistics in Africa. One of the most closely watched initiatives is the Lobito Corridor, the rail and port network linking Angola’s Atlantic coast to mineral-rich regions of the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia. Supporters say the project could shorten supply chains and improve transport links for copper and cobalt exports. Critics, however, argue that it may reinforce the long-standing pattern in which African countries ship out raw materials while capturing only a fraction of the value.

Europe is pursuing a similar logic through trade and investment deals that tie access to minerals to support for green infrastructure. The challenge, as industry and policy specialists often note, is that producer countries increasingly want local processing, not just extraction. That leaves Western buyers asking for secure supply while host countries demand a bigger share of the downstream value chain, making long-term alignment difficult.

Even where geological potential exists, turning it into supply is slow. New mines and processing plants can take 15 to 20 years to move from permitting to production, and environmental approvals can delay projects further. Ukraine holds a large share of the minerals classified as critical by the EU, but war and occupation have left much of that resource base out of reach. In Europe itself, deposits in countries such as Sweden face long permitting timelines and community opposition, reinforcing the gap between strategic ambition and industrial reality.

Recycling and material substitution may ease some of the pressure, but they are not quick fixes. The IEA expects secondary supply to play a larger role over time, especially for copper and cobalt, yet even optimistic scenarios leave a need for substantial primary mining. Alternative battery chemistries, including sodium-ion and lower-cobalt formulations, could reduce dependence on some constrained materials, but commercial scale remains uncertain.

For industrial decarbonisation, the lesson is clear: the energy transition is also a minerals transition. Its pace will depend not only on technology and finance, but on the ability of governments and companies to diversify supply, expand refining capacity, build recycling systems and negotiate more equitable partnerships with producer countries. The clean economy of the 2030s will be shaped as much by geology and geopolitics as by engineering.